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LEGISLATION ON CRIME IN TWENTY-FIVE

YEARS
EDvARD LINDSEY'

Legislation, in the sense now generally given to the word, is a
modem and quite recent phenomenon. The conception of it as the
command of the state or political sovereign and as equivalent to law
or a source of it followed upon the growth of the idea of the national
state which took place in the eighteenth century. Its employment to
any great extent was a development of the nineteenth century while
its volume has shown a marked and steady increase during the present

one. Regarded as a source of law legislation has invaded the legal
field in varying degree as to different parts of it but as relates to the

definition, punishment and methods of dealing with crime the whole
field has been taken over and the prevalent conception of a crime
now is an act declared by the state to be an offense against it.
The growth of the absolute monarchies which preceded and prepared the way for the political revolutions in western Europe saw a
multiplication of crimes and punishments of barbarous 'Variety and
severity. This has been well set forth by Dean Pound.2 At the
end of the seventeenth century in England, he says, all felonies and
all thefts of more than the value of a shilling committed by those
who could not read were capitally punishable and executions averaged
eight hundred a year, while flogging, cutting off the ears, branding
and the pillory were some of the punishments for minor offenses. In
Blackstone's day the number of felonies without benefit of clergy was
one hundred and sixty and the barbarous punishments remained although the use of imprisonment and transportation was increasing.
The humanitarian movement sought to reform the criminal law
through legislation based on the newer political ideas and the rationalist philosophy. The reformers such as Beccaria at the end of the
eighteenth century and Bentham at the beginning of the nineteenth
rationalized the concept of crime as an offense against the state and
restated in legislation the definitions of offenses simplifying and reducing them to the basis of a minimum standard of conduct for persons regarded as autonomous individuals, equal before the law in
rationality and accountability.
'Formerly Justice of the Circuit Court, Warren, Pa.
2
Criminal Justice in America, Chapter III.
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Statutory Crimes
The expanding use of legislation in the early part of the nineteenth century was in effecting reforms in the penal law in accordance with the changing views as to crime and punishment and an advancing humanitarianism. It brought about a reduction in the number of offenses, amelioration in the punishments and a simplification
of this branch of the law. But again soon after the commencement
of the present century the creation of statutory offenses and legislation both as to crime and criminal procedure began to increase and
in our period the rate of this increase has become accelerated. The
number of new statutory crimes has never, so far as I know, been
counted; there is in regard to this, as to many other matters relating to crime, no definite and accurate statistical material available.
Some estimates have been made. The Report of the President's
Research Committee on Social Trends states that there has been a
growth of about forty per cent in the thirty years from 1900 to 1930
in selected states as measured by sections in their criminal codes.3
Professors Sutherland and Gehlke, in their chapter on "Crime and
Punishment" in the same Report,4 say that "the number of sections
in the penal code of the federal government increased from 264 in
1900 to 383 in 1930, or forty-five per cent, while the number of
sections in the penal codes for fourteen states grew from 7,156 in
1900 to 9,609 in 1930, an increase of thirty-four per cent." They
conclude that the average rate of increase of statutory crimes during
the last thirty years has been from one to two per cent a year. In
Rhode Island Dean Pound found that in 1822 the statutes defined fifty
crimes, in 1872 one hundred and twenty-eight crimes and in 1923 the
number had grown to two hundred and twelve." He also says that
out of one hundred thousand persons arrested in Chicago in 1912 more
than one-half were held for violation of legal precepts which did not
exist twenty-five years before.8 In Pennsylvania about one hundred
new statutes were passed in the eight legislative sessions from 1907
to 1933 but many of these statutes define more than one crime--often
several. To state an average rate of increase would be misleading
as the number in different sessions varies widely, forty-four having
been passed in one session-that of 1923.
These statements do not give a complete picture however because
there are in addition new crimes created in statutes relating to subjects
SVol. I, p. lviii.
4
Vol. II, Chap. XXII.
SCriminal Justice irY America, p. 16.
bid., p. 23.
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such as Public Health, Sanitation, Fire Protection, Labor and Industry, Bills of Lading, Sales in Bulk, Liquors, Warehouse Receipts, Motor Vehicles, et cetera. Certainly there are a good many more crimes
to commit now than there were twenty-five years ago. Of course
some of these statutes are amendments to prior statutes, some are
merely redefinitions, others only for the purpose of increasing the
punishment for some offense and still others extend the concept of
some crime to embrace perhaps new things or situations. Thus stealing seeds is made larceny by one statute and likewise growing crops
by another. In addition to the general statute relating to cruelty to
animals the Pennsylvania legislature of 1911 thought it necessary to
define a separate misdemeanor of cruelty to a cow and the session of
1909 had already made it a misdemeanor to "lead a debilitated horse."
A statute on the arson of motor vehicles seems natural in our period
but it is somewhat surprising to find one creating the crime of "abuse
of confidence of livery stable keepers." Bribery in connection with
athletic contests is one of the most severely punished of misdemeanors
in Pennsylvania though shooting a man by mistake for an animal
carries the same term of imprisonment-five years.
Of course the more serious offenses remain practically as they
were taken over from the common law and put in statutory form.
These are the real crimes in the social consciousness as distinguished
from the crimes solely by legislative fiat. It is perhaps true that the
newer crimes are largely less serious types of offense from the social
standpoint. There are among them new varieties of crime. Thus
the pure food statutes added one new variety and the narcotic drug
acts another. The automobile necessitated codes of traffic rules and
the prohibition statutes are the outstanding indicators of new crimes.

Altogether much reading in the statute books gives the impression of
a shifting and changing, heterogeneous mass of rules, prohibitions
and taboos thrown off in varying quantities from the sessions of our
legislative bodies. Can we discern in this mass of pronouncements
on crime any sustained purposes, any basis of theory or any trends
whether conscious or not?
Trend Toward Individualism
The earlier part of our period saw the growth of several sorts
of legislation based upon ideas of individualization rather than standardization in the treatment of the offender. The appearance of Juvenile Courts began in 1899 when the first Juvenile Court was created
in Illinois. The plan was to consider the child offender not as a
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criminal but as a delinquent needing care, correction and training
applied so far as possible according to the circumstances of each individual. The notion made an immediate appeal and the Juvenile
Court system spread by imitation from state to state and it now exists
in some form in every state except Maine and Wyoming. Varying
somewhat from state to state, many changes and modifications of
detail have been and continue to be made in the Juvenile Court statutes nor are they, in spite of all this experimentation, by any means
satisfactory today. There remain needless conflicts with legal theory
and the jumbling of purely dependency problems with those of delinquency is inconsistent and detrimental; but the general scheme of
dealing with the child offender separately and individually as a problem of his adjustment in the social structure has proven sound and
is fully accepted. Indeed the Juvenile Court idea has extended itself over the whole family group and Courts of Domestic Relations
have been established in many states especially in the larger cities.
This has been a natural development as the problems of the children
are generally dependent upon or the result of problems of the family
itself.
The Juvenile Court in its dealing with delinquent children has
made use of ideas in regard to the treatment of offenders which had
been growing up during the latter half of the nineteenth century.
They were translated into legislation as related to criminals increasingly during the present century. Suspended sentence had long been
practiced by the courts and by statute the placing of a convicted adult
upon probation was added. Provided chiefly in the cases of young
and first offenders and those guilty of lesser offenses probation, especially when probation officers were provided to supervise and advise
the person during the probationary period, affords an opportunity to
rehabilitate the convict, save him from the stigma of imprisonment
and perhaps restore him to his place in the community.
Perhaps the virtue most frequently claimed for probation is
that it prevents the deterioration which only too commonly takes place
in the prisoner as a result of prison life. Prison life must be an unnatural one at best especially when prolonged but the idea of providing
a system of treatment of the convict during his term of imprisonment
which would tend to reform and rehabilitate him grew up during the
nineteenth century. It had a conspicuous development in the provision for reformatories for young, first offenders of which the first
in this country was the celebrated Elmira reformatory in New York
State. The extension of reformatory methods to the prisons for
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older and more serious offenders to any extent at all was effected only
in our period. This growth has been slow though steady, but only
a moderate degree of progress has even yet been made.
In connection with the reformatory method of treatment the devices of parole and of the indeterminate sentence were availed of.
The latter would make the sentence of imprisonment instead of a
definite term one merely with a maximum limit or with a minimum
and maximum widely apart. After the service of the minimum term,
if there be one, the prisoner, if considered fit, may be paroled for a
further period under the supervision of a parole officer until he is
thought fit for discharge from parole or the maximum term has expired. Parole may of course be provided under a definite sentence.
Originally provided only for the reformatories, parole spread to the
state prisons and penitentiaries by imitation, and from state to state,
and now is provided for in nearly all of them. The indeterminate
sentence has had a similar though less extensive spread. These three
elements: a reformatory training within the prison, possibility of detention for a sufficiently long period and a period of parole under
aid and supervision are essential parts of the reformatory scheme.
In connection with the latter element an independent and intelligent
parole board to select the cases proper to parole and a sufficient number of capable parole officers to supervise the parolees are requisites.
The statutes vary widely in the provision made for these essentials.
Variations in details are legion and changes are frequently made from
time to time. The inadequate way in which the essentials have been
provided or often not provided sufficiently accounts for the fact that
the value of the whole scheme or parts of it is frequently questioned.
In many cases parole has been adopted because it improves discipline
and. under some statutes, keeps down prison population rather than
on account of its effect upon the prisoner.
All these classes of statutes which have been multiplying the last
twenty-five years have underlying them a view of the criminal opposed to that of man as a moral agent capable of choosing whether
or not he will obey the statute, whether he will do or refrain from
any act denominated as criminal by statutory law. That view is that
human conduct is the result of a man's inheritance, environment, training and experience and that the criminal has in fact little freedom of
choice as to his conduct. There are other theories which enter into
the ideas underlying these statutes but they may be fairly regarded
as largely expressions on the theoretical side of the penal philosophy
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known as positivist as opposed to the older and still more prevalent
one known as classical.
A related view of the criminal is that of the psychiatrists who
regard the criminal act merely as a symptom of an abnormal or mentally unhealthy condition of the patient (criminal). They regard
the criminal as a sick man to be restored if possible or if not, isolated.
While this extreme view has had little acceptance generally, it has to
some extent modified the prevailing view as to responsibility and
especially as to disposition of the offender. Statutes providing for
psychiatric examination of persons charged with crime, of those convicted and in juvenile court cases have been passed in many of the
states in recent years and are rapidly spreading.
The general trend manifested by these classes of statutes we
might characterize as an expanding one in that it regards as important not just the criminal act but the individual actors and their
characteristics and personalities.
Toward Classicism
In the latter part of our period on the contrary there may be
discerned alongside the expanding what we might term a contracting
trend looking toward the classical penal philosophy and based upon
the still prevailing rationalist and moralist view of the criminal. First
among the classes of statutes exhibiting this trend are those based
on critical attitudes toward the various provisions we have been discussing; statutes limiting probation or parole, providing they may not
apply to those convicted of certain offenses, raising the minimum term
of indeterminate sentence and otherwise minimizing the statutes previously adopted. Then there are a mass of acts providing for more
severe punishment for various offenses. For example in Pennsylvania
a series of statutes in 1911 made pandering, acceptance of bawd
money, detention of a female against her will and transporting a female for immoral purposes, felonies punishable by ten years imprisonment. Malicious injury to Railroad property was made a felnny in 1913. In 1921 sedition was made a felony punishable with
$10,000 fine and twenty years imprisonment. Maliciously causing a
forest fire was in 1923 made a felony with a fine of $5,000 and ten
years imprisonment. Every notorious kidnapping case is followed
by a flock of statutes increasing the penalty for that crime.
Then there are the so-called habitual criminal acts; that is, those
imposing an increasingly severe penalty on one convicted of a second
or subsequent offense of the same grade. Habitual criminal acts
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are by no means new but in very recent years they have been passed
in many states in very drastic form. The so-called Baumes laws
passed in New York in 1926 are the prototypes of this recent legislation. The main features of these statutes are that they provide much
severer penalties for the more serious offenses. In the case of second
and third convictions of felonies the convict must be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not less than the longest term, nor more than
twice the longest term, prescribed upon a first conviction. Thus robbery and burglary having a maximum term of imprisonment of fifteen
years a person convicted a second time of either of these offenses
cannot be sentenced to less than fifteen nor more than thirty years,
A person convicted a fourth time of any felony must be sentenced
to life imprisonment. These statutes were widely discussed and were
imitated in many states. In some the sentence to life imprisonment
was left discretionary with the court instead of mandatory and in
others the drastic provisions were applicable in the case of misdemeanors. Possibilities under these statutes are sufficiently illustrated
by what is known as the Michigan case in which one Frederick Palm
received a sentence of life imprisonment after having been found
guilty, as a fourth offender, of illegally possessing a pint of liquor.
These statutes are explained by their advocates as corrective of too
lenient treatment, of what they consider the failure of probation and
parole statutes, of what they describe in a sort of a slogan as "coddling
the criminal." So far as they have any underlying penal theory it is
that of deterrence though in the life imprisonment provisions there is
7
a sub-current of the dangerous individual idea of the positivists.
Sporadic Prohibitions
Thus we recognize opposing trends in certain classes of statutes
which seem to rest upon conflicting theories of criminal law and of
the function of punishment. There are however a great mass of
enactments which are nothing but sporadic and arbitrary prohibitions
formulated in statutory form with no more elaborate theoretical basis
than a blind faith that all that is necessary to control human conduct
is to issue an edict about it in the name of the State. The notion
that legislation is the command of the State viewed as society in an
organized capacity is too transparent a fiction nowadays. It is patent
that statutes for the most part are not formulated by the theoretically
TA competent portrayal and interesting discussion of these different trends
and conflicting theories is: "Conflicting Penal Theory in Statutory Law," by
Mabel A. Elliott, Chicago, 1931.
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omnipotent legislature but by groups of various sorts which press
them upon the attention of the legislatures through lobbying. The
force of the pressure exerted and not a judgment reached through
deliberation of the desirability of the proposed act generally determines whether it shall be enacted. Only the belief in the possibility
of accomplishing anything by statutory declaration can explain the
multiplicity of such declarations. The attempt to control details of
morals and habits by the criminal law clearly appears. It is sufficient
merely to cite the prohibition experiment in this connection.
Criminal Procedure
We have space for but a brief mention of legislation as to criminal procedure. The court procedure in the trial of the criminal is
public, is reported as news and consequently attention is focussed on
it in any consideration of the problem of crime. Scores of popular
articles denounce "our outgrown and archaic" criminal procedure
and even some groups in the legal profession have promoted many
so-called reforms in procedure. These take the forms of doing away
with indictments, abolishing the grand jury, providing for waiver of
jury trial, majority verdicts and so on. This seems to indicate a
general movement away from the jury as an institution. The function of pleading as an essential element in the institution is ignored.
Yet there are indications pointing in the opposite direction. Improved
methods of selecting and impaneling juries and of making up jury
lists; the formation of grand jury associations in some places, are
some of these indications. Thus here too we seem to recognize opposing trends. The changes proposed have little to recommend them
and the reasons given for them are not convincing. Certainly a system of procedure which could handle with little complaint the vast
number of cases of totally new crimes that were dumped into the
courts by the prohibition acts cannot be very sick and that the jury
trial system can function after the mutilation made by some reforms
shows considerable vitality. But in any event court procedure deals
with a relatively small portion of the total criminal cases. The
Criminal Justice Surveys made in several states disclosed that the
chief failure of our machinery of criminal justice occurs at the very
beginning. Of crimes reported to the police in a large percentage of
cases there is never any arrest at all. At the time of a recent celebrated kidnapping case the popular reaction was that the punishment
for kidnapping should be increased. But of what avail is that if the
kidnapper cannot be discovered? Of prosecutions brought the num-
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ber eliminated is due to dismissals before the trial is reached rather
than to acquittals. Alfred Bettman in his Criminal Justice Surveys
Analysis in the Report on Prosecution to the National Commission
on Law Enforcement says: "The statistics point to the conclusion
that in the attention given to the jury trial and to questions of trial
procedure, there has been and still is a mistaken emphasis." It is
rather the matter of administration that needs attention; the personnel,
equipment and methods of the police, the prosecuting attorneys and
court officials. These matters have largely hitherto escaped attention.
Conclusion
The strongest impression left upon the mind after surveying
the legislation as to crime is one of nervous reaction of the social
mass or of groups within it to impinging stimulae. We have tried
to see certain rational theories underlying the phenomena but the
question arises whether after all these theories are more than rationalizations after the fact. The older traditional crimes such as murder,
certain sexual offenses and certain offenses against property and the
person remain about the same as they were taken over from the common law and indeed reappear much the same in all criminal legal
systems. Beyond that the one unifying conception seems to be the
democratic faith or dogma that the people, envisaged anthropomorphically as the "State," can accomplish anything by commanding it
in a set form of words-the statute. To promulgate the statute is
thought to effect the result desired. This rigid verbal formula is
strangely like the spell of the magician, believed to operate by some
potent but mysterious magic force. It appears little different from
the taboo of the savage except that it is not effective to produce results. The faith of the savage in the sanction of magic and sacred
social power behind the taboo has been lost and replaced only by a
threat imperfectly and infrequently carried out. The dream of a
reasoned and progressive control of social conduct by the formulations of governments is largely unrealized. Perhaps it awaits the development of a real political and legal science based strictly on objective observation and verification and not on subjective opinion.

